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SPEECH

We, the Judges, and the Environment
ANTÔNIO HERMAN BENJAMIN*
It is an honor to open this International Symposium on
Environmental Courts and Tribunals. Let me first thank the
symposium’s organizers, especially Pace University School of
Law, the International Judicial Institute for Environmental
Adjudication, the Environmental Law Institute, and other
institutions involved, for putting forward this timely and
important initiative.
I attribute my invitation to speak here today to the fact that
my country, Brazil, notwithstanding the serious environmental
degradation and enormous deforestation of the past fifty years,
continues to be both our planet’s richest reserve of biodiversity
and, simultaneously, an experimental laboratory with new and
creative models of environmental legislation, both in terms of
policy design as well as compliance and enforcement. I will
illustrate some of the propositions I make with precedents set by
the High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça, or STJ),
which has issued dozens of decisions that in the past twenty
years that have changed the face of environmental law in the
country. In doing so, I will limit my citations to opinions that I
wrote for the Court, since a more comprehensive analysis of the
STJ’s environmental role can be found in the article written by
Nick Bryner and included in the present issue of this law review.
Justice, High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça); Professor,
Catholic University of Brasília. Translation by Nicholas S. Bryner. [Editor’s
Note: This is the text of a speech given at the International Symposium on
Environmental Courts and Tribunals, hosted by Pace Law School and the
International Judicial Institute for Environmental Adjudication (IJIEA), on
April 1, 2011, in White Plains, New York. Any annotations to the text of this
speech have been added by the author in connection with its publication in this
Special Edition].
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I will begin with the obvious common ground: we live in an
era of rapidly disappearing species and ecosystems, a scenario
made more worrisome by the uncertainties associated with
climate change. The very basis of life is under threat. This
observation has repercussions for the theme that I have been
asked to analyze: judges and the environment. Judges have had
the final word on how social interactions affect our lives – the
beginning and the termination of life, family life, life in the
marketplace, emotional life, and so on. We have never questioned
the intervention of courts in these diverse fields of social
interaction.
The intellectual task here, then, is to investigate the role of
judges in the protection of the basis of life itself – the judicial
concern with the a priori, with the natural planetary systems
that precede and sustain our everyday existence.
Logical
reasoning suggests that if it is the judge’s responsibility to
preserve human life, then it must also be up to the judiciary to
ensure whatever is necessary to maintain all living beings,
ourselves and all others — the foundations of life. Nevertheless,
we know that judicial intervention in environmental matters,
despite some success stories around the world, still does not exist
in many countries. In some legal systems, courts have merely
rhetorical or symbolic participation in the implementation of
environmental laws; in others, their role is questioned; in still
others, courts are incapable of reducing, much less stopping, the
extinction of species and the irreversible loss of precious
ecosystems and biomes.
It is within this context that I intend to analyze: (a) two
different models of judicial participation of courts in
environmental governance; (b) two concrete forms of judicial
action in resolving environmental conflicts; (c) the challenges to
judicial practice in this area; and (d) the prospects for the near
future, a reflection that, of course, will stem from my experience
as a Brazilian.
Although it is somewhat of an oversimplification, I believe it
is possible to identify two broad basic models of judicial protection
of the environment, based on the types of roles courts play in
governance of natural resources. On one side is the spectator
judiciary, an institutional “non-actor” or peripheral actor in
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responding to the environmental crisis.
This is the
environmental laissez-faire approach, in which law and judges
continue to be seen as tools of the State, used primarily for the
protection and enforcement of property, contracts, and family
relationships.
The rest – including the protection of the
environment – is reserved for public policy and administrative
discretion, a prohibited territory for judicial exploration, except in
very limited situations (like nuisance), which are, by definition,
exceptional. Of course, we will find no law that says expressly or
openly that judges must keep away from environmental conflicts.
The judicial system reaches this result indirectly by maintaining
the same legal patterns, both substantive and procedural, that
have guided judges’ practice for centuries.
There are various arguments – political and technical – put
forward to suggest that courts should employ this hands-off
approach in dealing with the environmental crisis. It can be said
that environmental conflicts raise legal issues that are too
complex – take, for example, industrial pollution, groundwater
contamination, or the difficulty of establishing causation in a
specific case of species extinction. The judiciary, goes the
argument, does not have the necessary resources nor the
experience to deal with such a high level of scientific and
technical complexity.
Proponents of the spectator judiciary may further point out
that environmental disputes do not always present themselves in
a crystallized manner so as to fit perfectly in existing legal molds.
This, it could be argued, would force judges to enter into the
murky and judicially prohibited waters of political confrontation
and policymaking, which are the exclusive provinces of other
state actors – namely, those elected directly by the people – which
cannot be labeled (as judges can) as democratically illegitimate.
Finally, environmental conflicts require quick action or response,
which is incompatible with the slow pace of the court system that,
due to its bureaucracy and technical rituals, eventually becomes
an obstacle to effective protection of the environment and to
economic progress.
In my view, none of these arguments in defense of the
spectator judiciary hold water. Judges, in the course of their
traditional duties, often deal with complex social and technical
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questions, such as family conflicts, or uncertainties regarding the
protection of minors, the elderly, the sick, or those in a coma, who
may lack the capacity to fully and freely express their consent.
Judges today are confronted with all sorts of technological
difficulties while resolving intellectual property disputes. Yet to
decide well, a judge need not transform her chambers into a
university or specialized research institute. It is precisely for this
reason that judges have the power to appoint experts or special
masters to conduct studies, even the most sophisticated ones
requiring cooperation among various academic fields.
On the other hand, the slow pace of the judicial process,
while undeniable, can be corrected or improved with legal and
management innovations and should not be taken as an
argument to distance courts from just one single type of conflict –
environmental.
Finally, undoubtedly, we expect judges
(especially civil law judges) to respect the fine line between the
legal and the political. This again presents no obstacle for the
courts. Here we should distinguish between the application of
legislated public policy and the judicial creation of public policy.
This distinction was highlighted in a decision of the High Court of
Brazil:
In Brazil, unlike other countries, courts do not create obligations
for environmental protection. They spring forth from the law,
after having passed through Parliamentary analysis. Therefore,
we do not need activist judges, for the activism is done by the law
and by the constitutional text. . . . [Fortunately,] our Judiciary is
not confounded by a sea of gaps or a festival of legislative halfwords. If a gap exists, it is not due to the lack of a law, nor even
a defect in the law; it is because of the absence of or a deficiency
in administrative and judicial implementation of the unequivocal
environmental duties established by the legislator.1

As I look around, I believe that, in environmental
governance, we are increasingly living in the era of the
protagonist judiciary (something quite different from an activist
judiciary), or at least moving toward it. This is the result of a
series of political and legal developments beginning with the
1. S.T.J., REsp 650.728/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman
Benjamin, 23.10.2007, at 15-16 (Braz.).
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Stockholm Conference in 1972. First, treaties and international
documents began requiring States to legislate – and legislate
effectively – on environmental protection. As we know well, laws
are enacted so that they may be enforced – including judicially –
when violated. In addition, many countries in the world have
“greened” their constitutions, raising the stature of
environmental protection and transforming it from a legal into a
constitutional paradigm. This is not, and should not be, a merely
cosmetic legal change. Lastly, since the Rio Conference in 1992,
the international community’s emphasis has moved in the
direction of compliance and enforcement of environmental policies
and law.
Currently, many national constitutions expressly recognize a
right to a clean and safe environment (the specific terminology
and language varies significantly among different constitutional
texts), some going further to attribute an ecological function to
property rights, as in the case of Brazil and Colombia, for
example.
Even in countries that only recently embraced
democracy and the rule of law, after decades of military or civil
dictatorship, it is considered unacceptable to recognize rights
without connected duties and, more importantly, without
agreeing, at least in theory, to the legitimacy of judicial
intervention in guaranteeing those rights. Furthermore, in the
modern world, it is impossible to separate the environment from
the protection of traditional rights and goods, such as health and
property. Nor can we forget that, in the new constitutionalism,
the rule of law occupies a central place. And the true rule of law
cannot exist without ecological sustainability and an independent
judiciary.
All this to stress the fact that an environmental hands-off
court system not only contradicts the needs of our time, but
fundamentally plays against – a sort of judicial disobedience or
“negative judicial activism” – the constitutional and legal
framework put in place. It becomes clear then that the critique of
the judicialization of environmental conflicts should have other,
deeper roots that are perhaps unspoken or less transparent.
I should begin with possibly the most fundamental and
controversial aspect of this debate: environmental protection
redistributes ecological value, and by so doing, redistributes
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economic value as well and reorganizes property rights. This is
the redistributive function of environmental law. Think about
how the equation of negative environmental externalities is
reversed when statutes and courts begin to require a polluter to
install emissions control equipment; or when environmental law,
as in Brazil, prohibits rural landowners in the Amazon from
clearing eighty percent of the area of their property. Basically,
what the legal system is stating here is that there is an ecological
function to property rights. In that respect, the High Court of
Brazil held that:
[C]ontemporary judicial regimes require that real properties –
rural or urban – serve multiple ends (private and public,
including ecological), which means that their economic utility is
not exhausted on one single use or the best use, let alone the most
lucrative use.
In truth, the Brazilian constitutional-legal order does not
guarantee property and business owners the maximum possible
financial return on private goods and on activities undertaken
[on real property].
Requirements of ecological sustainability in the pursuit and
utilization of economic goods are insufficient to show a “taking”
or an unjustified public intervention into the private domain.
Requiring individuals to comply with certain environmental
precautions in the use of their property is not discriminatory, nor
does it interfere with the principle of equal protection under the
law, principally because nothing can be confiscated from a person
if she does not properly own or hold title to it.
If landowners and occupiers are subject to the social and
ecological functions of property, it makes no sense to claim as
unjust the loss of something that, under the constitutional and
legal regime in effect, they never had, that is, the possibility of
complete, absolute use, in scorched-earth style, of the land and
its natural resources. Rather, making such claim would be an
illegal takeover . . . of the public attributes of private property
(essential ecological processes and services), which are “assets of
common use” in the terms of the heading to Article 225 of the
Constitution of 1988.2

2. S.T.J., REsp 1.109.778/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman
Benjamin, 10.11.2009, at 5 (Braz.) (emphasis added).
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There is an additional change occurring that affects
traditional judicial practice – the growth of collective access to
justice, which implies procedural recognition of new actors that,
by their nature, diversity, or quantity, are less susceptible to
manipulation or embarrassment by the environmentally
degrading state or powerful vested economic interests.
Furthermore, in federal states, such as Brazil, environmental
protection is often undertaken by federal courts, which weakens
and dilutes the power of local elites – and the pernicious
proximity to, and relationship with the state judiciary to which
those elites have become accustomed.
In sum, collective
adjudication reconfigures the individuality of environmental
harms, bringing not only the diffuse and intergenerational
components of degradation into play but also making sure that
Nature itself will not rest without protection.
When we speak of judicial action in environmental
protection, we in fact have two things in mind, which should be
clearly identified and separated. The more common and less
controversial function of the courts in environmental law is to
decide questions of respect, particularly from the state, for the
formal procedures provided by law. Here, the judge’s mission is
fundamentally to ensure a form of environmental due process,
which includes, for example, reviewing the appropriateness of
environmental licenses, the completeness of environmental
impact statements, the holdings of public hearings, and the
various steps and formalities in the procedure of creating
protected areas. This is formal judicial control and, as such, is
shallow from an ecological perspective.
More difficult, one could say, is when a court is called on to
undertake substantive environmental judicial control of
development projects, in which the judge is expected to – within
the background of the constitution and the law – weigh options
and internalize environmental costs. Here, the judge is called
upon to intervene in the murky waters in which decisions made
by administrative authorities and private property owners
overlap and interact. The danger is twofold: the judge must be
careful, on one hand, not to step into territory reserved for elected
officials; on the other, not to invade the fundamental core of
private property rights. Of course, in countries with vast and
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detailed constitutional and regulatory environmental frameworks
(like Brazil), the judicial task is less challenging than in
jurisdictions in which the judge has in front of her only a basket
of old precedents, ill-equipped to handle issues that go beyond the
protection of traditional health and property rights of individuals.
What are the challenges for us judges in the near future?
One clear difficulty is handling the weight of legislative sources –
international, national, and, increasingly, municipal – that are
progressively complex, heterogeneous, and fluid. Furthermore,
environmental law is comprised of a number of concepts that
challenge the very tradition of Western law, based on certainty
and security, to begin anew with the term “environment.” In
addition to this conceptual uncertainty, judges must adapt the
static character of law to the always-evolving nature of science.
Take one example: in the context of climate change, is it
acceptable and reasonable to look at legal rules for environmental
licensing in the usual way?
Another aspect to be considered is the still embryonic
principle of non-regression, a response to the fact that
environmental legislation in many countries is now waning.
There is a global struggle to maintain the gains of forty years of
legislative development. I see the principle of non-regression as
an emerging general principle of environmental law, which looks
ahead, to the future. Yet courts are often confronted with what
happened in the past (and not just the near past), especially in
countries that enacted environmental legislation as far back as
the 1960s but lacked the political will or human and financial
capacity to implement it. Such is the case of the Brazilian Forest
Code of 1965. The question here is what to do with those that
have been violating the law for decades, an issue that was
brought to the High Court of Brazil, which held:
There exists no acquired right to pollute or degrade the
environment. The passage of time cannot cure environmental
violations of a permanent nature, because some parties affected
by such actions – future generations – have neither a voice nor
representatives authorized to speak or remain silent in their
name.
Decades of illicit use of the rural property do not provide safe
harbor for the landowner or occupant to continue prohibited acts;
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nor do they legalize acts prohibited by statute, above all in the
area of inalienable rights, which all enjoy, including future
generations, as is the case of environmental protection.3

The courts, however, will not be able to protect the
environment unless there is a strong cultural desire to do so as
well. Changing the law is one thing, but transforming centuriesold, deeply-rooted cultural traditions would be challenging for any
judicial regime or nation. This point did not go unnoticed in a
precedent issued by the High Court of Brazil:
In Brazil, “knocking down” and “replacing the old with the new”
have always been the order of the day, in the city and in the
fields. In the spirit of the Brazilian, carved out over 500 years of
historical conquest of the natural and of the old, progress
becomes synonymous with denying the value and legitimacy of
the past and the future, such that our “immediatism” only allows
us to recognize the identity, legitimacy, and necessities of the
present. As such, the natural tendency is to reject, disbelieve, or
obstruct any legal regime that stands in the way of tractors,
cranes, dynamite, chainsaws . . . .4

I conclude today by citing another precedent of the High
Court of Brazil. The main issue in this case was the validity of
the private conservation easement clauses put in building
contracts at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, an urban
planning case whose wording fits perfectly within the realm of
nature conservation:
Although courts do not design, build or administer cities, that
does not mean they cannot do anything for them. No judge, no
matter how great her interest in, knowledge of, or ability in the
art of urban planning, architecture and landscape, will take upon
herself anything beyond the simple role of engineering the legal
discourse. And, as we know, cities will not rise or evolve with
words alone. But words spoken by judges can indeed encourage
destruction or legitimize conservation, endorse speculation or
guarantee urban environmental quality, consolidate the errors of
3. S.T.J., REsp 948.921/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman
Benjamin, 23.10.2007, at 1 (Braz.).
4. S.T.J., REsp 840.918/DF (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon,
14.10.2008, at 32 (Majority Opinion of Min. Antonio Herman Benjamin) (Braz.).
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the past, repeat them in the present, or enable a sustainable
future.5

Thank you very much.

5. S.T.J., REsp 302.906/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman
Benjamin, 26.08.2010, at 4 (Braz.).
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